{
 "as_of": "2026-07-21T23:26:38.981371",
 "condition": "Knowledge-only: claude-haiku-4-5 answering with NO documents (parametric knowledge), graded by each harness's own judge",
 "harness": "test_scotus_vs_llm",
 "n": 100,
 "knowledge_only": {
  "currency_correct": 0.48
 },
 "wall_s": 45.4,
 "rows": [
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_000",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) is not good law. It was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which held that \"separate but equal\" violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown established that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 73
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_001",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Bowers v. Hardwick is not good law. It was overruled by Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which struck down sodomy laws as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence remains the controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 65
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Bowers v. Hardwick was overruled by Lawrence v. "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_002",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. *Adkins v. Children's Hospital*, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), was overruled by *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish*, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). *Adkins* had struck down minimum wage laws as violating due process, but *West Coast Hotel* upheld Washington State's minimum wage law and explicitly overruled *Adkins*, establishing that minimum wage legislation is constitutional.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 110
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Adkins was overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_003",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) is no longer good law. It was overruled by United States v. Darby (1941), which upheld Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate child labor through the Fair Labor Standards Act. Darby established the modern broad interpretation of Congress's commerce power that remains controlling precedent today.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 82
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Hammer v. Dagenhart was overruled by United Stat"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_004",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) is not good law. It was explicitly overruled three years later by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which held that students cannot be compelled to salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance on religious grounds. Barnette is the controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 88
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Minersville School District v. Gobitis was overr"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_005",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Breedlove v. Suttles: Precedential Status\n\n**Breedlove v. Suttles (1937) is no longer good law.** The Supreme Court effectively overruled it in *Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections* (1966), which struck down poll taxes in federal elections as violating the Equal Protection Clause. The 24th Amendment (1964) also prohibited poll taxes in federal elections, and the *Harper* decision extended this protection to state elections, rendering Breedlove's upholding of Georgia's poll tax unconstitutional.",
    "input_tokens": 80,
    "output_tokens": 133
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Breedlove v. Suttles is no longer good law and e"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_006",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Colegrove v. Green Status\n\n**No, Colegrove v. Green is no longer controlling precedent.** It was effectively overruled by *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which held that apportionment challenges present justiciable political questions subject to judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause. *Baker* rejected *Colegrove*'s holding that reapportionment disputes were non-justiciable political questions beyond the courts' reach.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 118
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Colegrove v. Green is no longer controlling prec"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_008",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Wolf v. Colorado (1949) is no longer controlling precedent. It was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which held that the exclusionary rule applies to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Mapp established that illegally obtained evidence must be excluded from trial in both federal and state courts.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 81
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Wolf v. Colorado was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_009",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), remains good law and controlling precedent. It established the constitutional right to counsel for criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney and has never been overruled or superseded.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 65
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer incorrectly states that Gideon has \"never been overruled or superseded,\" w"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_010",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Swift v. Tyson is not good law. It was overruled by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law rather than create a federal common law. Erie fundamentally changed the federal/state law relationship in civil litigation.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 84
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Swift v. Tyson is no longer good law and explici"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_011",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# National League of Cities v. Usery: Status\n\n**No, National League of Cities v. Usery is not good law.** It was overruled by *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which held that the Tenth Amendment does not provide an independent limit on Congress's Commerce Clause power and rejected the \"traditional governmental function\" test that *Usery* had established. *Garcia* remains the controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 114
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that National League of Cities v. Usery is not good l"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_012",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# United States v. Scott Status\n\n**United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)** remains good law and controlling precedent. The Supreme Court's holding\u2014that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial after a defendant's successful appeal of a conviction\u2014has not been overruled or superseded. While subsequent cases have refined its application in specific contexts, Scott remains the authoritative framework for analyzing double jeopardy issues in appeal scenarios.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 111
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer incorrectly states that United States v. Scott \"remains good law and contr"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_013",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), remains good law and controlling precedent. It established the \"totality of the circumstances\" test for evaluating probable cause based on informant tips, which the Supreme Court has not overruled or superseded.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 67
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer is discussing Illinois v. Gates (the overruling case), not Aguilar v. Texa"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_014",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), remains good law and controlling precedent. The Supreme Court has not overruled it, and it continues to govern the admissibility of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 63
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\nThe grading task asks whether the answer correctly identifies that "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_015",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) remains good law, though its precedential status was significantly altered by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022). Dobbs overruled Casey's core holding that the Constitution protects a right to abortion before viability, but reaffirmed Casey's undue burden standard as applicable to abortion restrictions that occur after states gain authority to regulate abortion. Thus Casey is partially overruled but still controlling precedent on the limited question of what constitutes an undue burden on abortion access where states have regulatory authority.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 126
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\nThe question asks whether **Roe v. Wade** is still controlling preced"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_028",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Olmstead v. United States (1928) is no longer controlling precedent. It was overruled by Katz v. United States (1967), which established that the Fourth Amendment protects people's reasonable expectations of privacy rather than just physical spaces or property, fundamentally changing wiretapping and electronic surveillance law.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 73
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Olmstead is no longer controlling precedent and "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_029",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "United States v. Ross (1982) remains good law regarding vehicle searches incident to arrest. However, its scope was significantly limited by Riley v. California (2014), which held that police cannot search a cell phone found during a lawful arrest without a warrant. Ross's core holding\u2014that police may search a vehicle's interior without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband is inside\u2014is still controlling precedent for traditional vehicle searches, but Riley carved out an important exception for digital devices.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 106
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer discusses United States v. Ross and Riley v. California, but fails to addr"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_031",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Dennis v. United States\n\n**No, Dennis v. United States is not controlling precedent in its original form.** The Supreme Court's 1969 decision in *Brandenburg v. Ohio* effectively superseded Dennis's \"clear and present danger\" test with the more speech-protective \"imminent lawless action\" standard. Brandenburg now controls First Amendment cases involving advocacy of illegal conduct, requiring that speech be directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to incite or produce such action.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 109
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Dennis v. United States is not controlling prece"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_032",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), remains good law and a controlling Supreme Court precedent. However, its scope has been significantly narrowed by subsequent decisions\u2014the Court has substantially limited the \"fighting words\" doctrine it established, requiring that such speech create an imminent likelihood of lawless action and be directed at the person addressed. Modern courts apply *Chaplinsky*'s framework much more restrictively than the original opinion suggested.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 108
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states that *Chaplinsky* \"remain"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_033",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Beauharnais v. Illinois* (1952) is no longer good law. The Supreme Court has effectively overruled it through subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly *Brandenburg v. Ohio* (1969) and *R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul* (1992), which established that group libel laws and hate speech restrictions violate the First Amendment. Modern doctrine does not recognize a categorical \"group libel\" exception to free speech protection.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 109
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Beauharnais v. Illinois is no longer good law an"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_035",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), remains good law and controlling Supreme Court precedent. It established the rule that a waiver of the right to counsel must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently\u2014a standard still applied in federal cases today. However, its application has been refined by later cases like Strickland v. Washington (1984) regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 100
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer incorrectly states that Johnson v. Zerbst \"remains good law and controllin"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_036",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Betts v. Brady* (1942) is no longer good law. It was overruled by *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963), which established that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel for criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney in all felony cases.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 72
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n- **currency_correct=1**: The answer correctly identifies that *Bett"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_037",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Escobedo v. Illinois - Current Status\n\n**Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) is no longer the controlling precedent for police interrogation rights.** It has been effectively superseded by **Miranda v. Arizona (1966)**, which established the now-familiar Miranda warnings requirement and became the primary framework governing custodial interrogation and the right to counsel during police questioning. While Escobedo remains good law and is not formally overruled, Miranda's more comprehensive protections have made Escobedo largely obsolete in practice.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 121
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Escobedo is no longer the controlling precedent "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_038",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. *Lochner v. New York* (1905) is no longer good law. The Supreme Court expressly overruled its substantive due process doctrine in *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish* (1937), establishing that economic and social regulations receive only rational-basis review rather than the strict scrutiny *Lochner* had applied. Courts now recognize the era of \"Lochner\" as a historical aberration.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 102
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Lochner v. New York is no longer good law, expli"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_039",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) is not good law. It was effectively overruled by the 13th Amendment (1865), which abolished slavery, and definitively overruled by the 14th Amendment (1868), which granted citizenship to all persons born in the United States\u2014directly contradicting the decision's holding that African Americans could not be citizens.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 86
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=1**: The answer clearly states that Dred Scott v"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_040",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), is still good law. It established that the insurance business is \"commerce\" subject to the Sherman Act, overruling the \"business of insurance\" exemption from the 1868 case Paul v. Virginia. However, its scope was substantially narrowed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, which exempted the \"business of insurance\" from federal antitrust laws when regulated by states, so it remains controlling precedent only to the extent consistent with that statutory carve-out.",
    "input_tokens": 83,
    "output_tokens": 134
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Paul v. Virginia was overruled by United States "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_044",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), is **no longer controlling precedent**. It was effectively overruled by Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which abandoned Aguilar's rigid two-prong test for evaluating informant reliability in Fourth Amendment cases and replaced it with a more flexible \"totality of circumstances\" approach. While Aguilar is still cited for historical context, Gates is the current controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 121
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_045",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, *Spinelli v. United States*, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), remains good law, though its practical significance has been substantially limited. The Supreme Court's decision in *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), replaced *Spinelli*'s rigid two-part test (the \"Aguilar-Spinelli test\") with a more flexible \"totality of the circumstances\" approach for evaluating probable cause based on informant tips. While *Spinelli* itself was not formally overruled, *Gates* effectively superseded its controlling precedential force in this context.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 145
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that *Illinois v. Gates* superseded *Spinelli*'s cont"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_046",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) is no longer controlling precedent. It was overruled by Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which established that executing individuals with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Atkins is now the controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 76
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Penry v. Lynaugh was overruled by Atkins v. Virg"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_047",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) is no longer controlling precedent. It was overruled by Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. Subsequently, Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) applied Miller retroactively to cases already final on direct appeal.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 79
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Stanford v. Kentucky is no longer controlling pr"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_050",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Fay v. Noia Status\n\n**Fay v. Noia (1963) is no longer controlling precedent.** It was substantially overruled by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, which replaced its \"deliberate bypass\" standard for procedural default in habeas corpus cases with the stricter \"cause and prejudice\" test. The Supreme Court has confirmed that AEDPA superseded Fay v. Noia's framework for federal habeas review.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 124
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: While the answer correctly identifies tha"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_031",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "**Paul v. Virginia (1869) is no longer good law.** The Supreme Court overruled it in *United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Association* (1944), which held that the business of insurance is interstate commerce subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, directly contradicting Paul's holding that insurance was not commerce.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 75
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Paul v. Virginia is no longer good law and expli"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_032",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission\n\n**Status**: This case is **no longer good law** in its controlling application.\n\nThe Washington Supreme Court's decision in *Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission*, 114 Wash. 2d 470 (1990), which held that the State couldn't tax stevedoring services performed on federal property, was effectively superseded by the **2010 Washington Legislature's amendment to RCW 82.04.088**. This amendment clarified that stevedoring services are subject to B&O tax, overriding the holding that certain stevedoring activities were exempt from state taxation.\n\nAdditionally, subsequent Washington cases have narrowed the decision's scope significantly.",
    "input_tokens": 84,
    "output_tokens": 170
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer fails to identify the actual U"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_033",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.\n\n**Yes, Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947), remains good law as controlling precedent.** This Supreme Court decision established important principles regarding the scope of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) and continues to be cited for its holdings on employee classification and statutory interpretation.\n\nHowever, it has been clarified and applied in subsequent cases, and some of its specific factual applications may have been limited by later decisions addressing different statutory provisions or circumstances.",
    "input_tokens": 83,
    "output_tokens": 139
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer states that Joseph v. Carter & Weekes remains \"good law as controlling pre"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_034",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "I don't have specific information about the current status of *Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor* in my training data. To determine whether this case remains good law and controlling precedent, you should:\n\n1. Check a legal research platform (Westlaw, LexisNexis, or Google Scholar) for the case's current status and any subsequent overrulings or reversals\n2. Verify the jurisdiction and court that decided it, as precedential value depends on your controlling authority\n\nIf you can provide additional details (jurisdiction, year, or subject matter), I may be able to offer more targeted guidance.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 134
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer does not identify that *Spector "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_035",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter Status\n\n**Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966)** remains good law as binding Supreme Court precedent. The case established that states cannot impose discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce, particularly regarding alcohol products, and this principle continues to be controlling authority in commerce clause jurisprudence.\n\nHowever, the Court's application of dormant commerce clause doctrine has evolved since 1966, and subsequent cases have refined the standards for evaluating state tax schemes affecting interstate commerce, so practitioners should consult more recent precedent for current analytical frameworks.",
    "input_tokens": 82,
    "output_tokens": 145
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer states that Seagram & Sons \"remains good law as binding Supreme Court prec"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_036",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Kring v. Missouri (1883) is not good law. The Supreme Court overruled it in *Weaver v. Graham*, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), which held that ex post facto principles protect individuals from increased criminal penalties applied retroactively, contrary to Kring's more permissive approach. The current controlling precedent is that retroactive increases in punishment violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 102
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: The answer correctly identifies that Krin"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_037",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Thompson v. Utah Status\n\n**Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) is no longer good law.** The Supreme Court effectively overruled it in *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment and requires 12-person juries in serious criminal cases. Thompson's holding that states could use smaller juries has been superseded by subsequent constitutional precedent requiring uniformity across state and federal trials.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 128
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Thompson v. Utah is no longer good law and cites"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_038",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which struck down the federal income tax as unconstitutional, was effectively overruled by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. The Sixteenth Amendment explicitly authorized Congress to levy income taxes without apportionment among the states, directly overcoming the Court's holding in Pollock.",
    "input_tokens": 83,
    "output_tokens": 98
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Pollock was overruled (via the Sixteenth Amendme"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_039",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt\n\n**Status: No, this case is no longer controlling precedent.**\n\n*Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt*, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), which addressed whether goods in transit are subject to state property taxes, was effectively superseded by **Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady**, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Complete Auto Transit established the modern four-part test for evaluating state tax validity under the Commerce Clause, displacing the earlier categorical approach that *Hooven & Allison* had applied. Most subsequent Supreme Court precedent relies on the *Complete Auto* framework rather than *Hooven & Allison*.",
    "input_tokens": 83,
    "output_tokens": 173
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Rationale:**\n- **currency_correct=1**: The answer correctly identifies that *Hooven"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_040",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Ex parte Bakelite Corp.\n\n**No, Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), is not controlling precedent.** It was effectively overruled by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1992, which established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the exclusive appellate court for patent cases, displacing the Supreme Court's holding that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over patent appeals. The Federal Circuit now controls patent appeals as the successor framework.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 117
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: The answer fails to identify the actual"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_041",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "**Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933)** remains good law on its core holding: private individuals cannot be prosecuted under federal conspiracy statutes for conspiring with federal officials to violate someone's constitutional rights, because the statute requires a \"person acting under color of law.\"\n\nHowever, this precedent has been substantially limited by **United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)**, which held that private persons *can* be prosecuted for conspiracy to interfere with federally protected rights under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241. The Guest Court distinguished Williams and effectively narrowed its scope, making Williams no longer controlling on whether private conspirators can face federal charges in certain contexts.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 169
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer fails to mention that Williams"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_042",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), which established that military courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over service members for non-service-connected crimes, is **no longer good law**. It was overruled by *Solorio v. United States*, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), which held that courts-martial have jurisdiction over any crime committed by a service member, regardless of whether the offense is service-connected. *Solorio* is the current controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 126
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that O'Callahan v. Parker is no longer good law and e"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_043",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Durham v. United States (1954)\n\n**No, Durham is not controlling precedent in federal criminal law.** The D.C. Circuit's \"product test\" from *Durham v. United States*, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)\u2014which allowed an insanity defense if the unlawful act was the \"product of mental illness\"\u2014was effectively superseded by the **Model Penal Code's ALI test** adopted by the D.C. Circuit in *United States v. Brawner*, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The *Brawner* test, which requires proof that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of conduct or conform conduct to law due to mental illness, is now the governing standard in federal courts and most jurisdictions.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 203
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Rationale:**\n\nThe answer discusses the 1954 D.C. Circuit case (*Durham v. United St"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_044",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Evans v. Gore is not good law. The Supreme Court overruled it in *O'Malley v. Woodrough*, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), which held that federal judges' salaries cannot be reduced by taxation, establishing the controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 71
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Evans v. Gore is not good law and has been overr"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_045",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "I don't have specific information about Miles v. Graham in my training data to definitively answer whether it remains good law. To determine the current status of this case, I recommend:\n\n1. Checking current case law databases (Google Scholar, Westlaw, LexisNexis)\n2. Looking for subsequent appellate decisions that cite, overrule, or distinguish it\n3. Verifying the jurisdiction and year of the decision\n\nIf you can provide the jurisdiction, year, and subject matter, I may be able to help more specifically.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 119
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer neither identifies that the case was overruled nor treats the original hol"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_046",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona\n\n**Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona**, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), remains good law and is still a controlling Supreme Court precedent. The case established important principles regarding state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment's application to federal question jurisdiction, and it has not been overruled or superseded.\n\nHowever, its specific holding regarding water rights and state sovereign immunity has been refined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions on Eleventh Amendment doctrine, particularly cases addressing Ex parte Young exceptions and the scope of state immunity.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 130
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer explicitly states that Bonelli Cattle remains \"good law\" and is \"still a c"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_047",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Reitz v. Mealey Status\n\n**Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941)** remains good law and has not been overruled. However, its precedential value is limited to specific contexts\u2014it primarily addresses jurisdiction and venue issues in federal courts rather than establishing broad controlling principles applied across multiple areas of law. You should verify its current application to your specific legal issue, as subsequent cases may have refined or limited its scope in particular practice areas.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 114
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer explicitly states that Reitz v. "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_048",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Kesler v. Department of Public Safety\n\nI cannot provide a definitive answer without knowing which specific *Kesler v. Department of Public Safety* case you're referencing, as there are multiple cases with this name across different jurisdictions and time periods.\n\n**To determine if it's still good law, you should:**\n- Verify the case citation, jurisdiction, and year\n- Use Westlaw, LexisNexis, or Google Scholar's \"Citing References\" feature to check if it's been overruled, reversed, or limited\n- Check for more recent appellate decisions that may have superseded it\n\nIf you provide the full citation and jurisdiction, I can offer more specific guidance.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 154
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Rationale:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer fails to identify that Kesler v."
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_049",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "**Meek v. Pittinger** (1975) is **no longer controlling precedent**. It was effectively overruled by **Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Pittenger** (2002), in which the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit all aid to religious schools, replacing Meek's strict separationist approach with a more permissive standard allowing certain forms of aid to religious institutions under Title I and other federal programs.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 108
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: While the answer correctly identifies t"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_050",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "**Wolman v. Walter** (1977) is no longer controlling precedent on its core holding. The Supreme Court's decision in **Town of Greece v. Galloway** (2014) and subsequent cases have significantly narrowed Wolman's strict separationist approach to the Establishment Clause. Most notably, the Court's recent decision in **Carson v. Makin** (2022) further eroded Wolman's restrictions on religious school funding by holding that excluding religious schools from generally available education benefits violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 125
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Wolman v. Walter is no longer controlling preced"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_051",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball*, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by *Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue*, 142 S. Ct. 1761 (2021), which rejected the reasoning underlying *Ball*'s restrictive approach to aid flowing to religious schools and established that generally applicable benefit programs cannot be struck down merely because they assist religious institutions.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 110
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that *Ball* is no longer controlling precedent and is"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_052",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Aguilar v. Felton is not controlling precedent. The Supreme Court overruled it in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), which upheld school voucher programs allowing aid to religious schools. More directly, the Court overruled Aguilar itself in City of New York v. Aguilar, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), holding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit public employees from providing remedial education services on the premises of religious schools.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 131
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Aguilar v. Felton is not controlling precedent a"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_053",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Whitney v. California (1927) is not controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), which established a more speech-protective standard requiring imminence and likelihood of lawless action rather than merely advocating abstract doctrine. While Whitney's reasoning about incitement is historically significant, Brandenburg's test now governs First Amendment cases involving inflammatory speech.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 84
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_054",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Valentine v. Chrestensen*, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by *Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council*, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), which established that commercial speech receives First Amendment protection (albeit at a lower level than non-commercial speech), thereby rejecting *Chrestensen*'s categorical exclusion of commercial speech from constitutional protection.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 112
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Valentine v. Chrestensen is no longer controllin"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_055",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), has been superseded. It was overruled by *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which established the modern three-part test for obscenity (*Miller test*). While *Roth*'s basic principle that obscene speech lacks First Amendment protection remains valid, its specific obscenity standard is no longer controlling law.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 109
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Roth was overruled by Miller v. California and e"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_056",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza\n\n**No, this case is no longer controlling precedent.** It was effectively overruled by *Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board*, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), which held that the First Amendment does not protect union picketing on privately-owned shopping center property. The Court in *Hudgens* rejected *Logan Valley's* reasoning that shopping centers had become the functional equivalent of public forums for purposes of free speech protection.",
    "input_tokens": 86,
    "output_tokens": 120
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that the case was overruled by *Hudgens v. National L"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_057",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Harris v. United States (2002) is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by United States v. Apodaca (2024), in which the Supreme Court held that mandatory minimum sentences based on facts found by judges (rather than admitted by defendants or found by juries) violate the Sixth Amendment\u2014directly contradicting Harris's holding on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 85
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer incorrectly identifies the overr"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_058",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, **Lustig v. United States**, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), remains good law regarding its holding that evidence obtained by federal officers through an illegal search by state officers is inadmissible in federal court under the Fourth Amendment. However, its practical significance has been superseded by **United States v. Leon**, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which established the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and by subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence refining when illegally obtained evidence must be excluded versus when it may be admitted under various exceptions.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 132
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: The answer states that Lustig \"remains go"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_059",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), is **not** controlling precedent on its core holding. It was effectively overruled by **Chimel v. California**, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which narrowed the scope of warrantless searches incident to arrest. Chimel established that such searches are limited to the arrestee's person and the area within their immediate control, rejecting Rabinowitz's more expansive \"premise control\" standard. While Rabinowitz has not been formally overruled on all points, courts do not follow it as controlling authority where Chimel applies.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 150
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_060",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Jones v. United States\n\nI'd need to know which **Jones v. United States** case you're referring to, as there are multiple Supreme Court decisions with that name. However, the most frequently cited is **Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)**, which held that GPS tracking of vehicles constitutes a \"search\" under the Fourth Amendment\u2014this remains good law and controlling precedent.\n\nIf you're asking about a different Jones case, please specify the year or subject matter, and I can provide a more precise answer about its current status.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 128
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer discusses a different case (Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)) r"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_061",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), which held that police cannot search the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest without a warrant, rejecting Sanders's application to modern digital devices. More broadly, Sanders's holding regarding warrantless searches of luggage in vehicles has been superseded by subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence limiting such searches.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 108
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer correctly identifies that Arka"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_062",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Robbins v. California*, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by *United States v. Chadwick*, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) regarding closed containers, and more directly superseded by *New York v. Belton*, 441 U.S. 391 (1981), which established the modern framework for vehicle searches incident to arrest. The current controlling authority on vehicle searches comes from *Arizona v. Gant*, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which further limited the scope of searches incident to arrest.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 152
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: While the answer correctly states that *R"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_063",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Ex parte Bain (1882) is **not** controlling precedent in modern patent law. It established the \"inventorship doctrine\" requiring that all inventors be named in a patent application, but the **America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 significantly reformed this area**. The AIA made patent applications and issued patents less vulnerable to invalidation based on inventorship errors, codifying this change in 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 256, which now allows correction of inventorship with less stringent requirements than the strict rule in Bain.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 125
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer fails to mention United States v"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_064",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Brantley v. Georgia Status\n\nI cannot identify a widely recognized Supreme Court case by that name that would establish controlling precedent. If you're referring to a specific state court decision or a lesser-known federal case, please provide additional context (such as the year, court, or subject matter) so I can give you an accurate answer about its current precedential status.\n\nIf you meant a different case name, I'd be happy to help clarify.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 99
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\nThe answer fails to identify or address Brantley v. Georgia at all, i"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_065",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Palko v. Connecticut (1937) is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), which held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. More broadly, Palko's \"selective incorporation\" doctrine\u2014which distinguished between fundamental rights requiring full incorporation and others requiring only \"fundamental fairness\"\u2014has been largely superseded by modern incorporation jurisprudence that applies most Bill of Rights protections to the states under the same standards as federal application.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 123
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: The answer correctly states that Palko is"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_066",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), remains good law and controlling precedent. It established that willfulness under federal tax crimes requires only knowledge of the tax law's requirements, not necessarily knowledge that one's conduct violated those requirements, and this standard continues to govern prosecutions for tax evasion and related offenses.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 81
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states that Bryan v. United St"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_067",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Sapir v. United States\n\nYes, **Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955)** remains good law as a Supreme Court precedent. The case, which held that a taxpayer's oral promise to pay a debt is not enforceable under federal law for tax purposes, has not been overruled or superseded. However, it is a narrow holding with limited contemporary application and is rarely cited in modern tax litigation.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 106
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states the case \"remains good la"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_068",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015), remains good law and controlling precedent. The Supreme Court has not overruled it, and it continues to govern the interpretation of the federal obstruction statute as applied to destruction of tangible evidence, establishing that the obstruction statute requires some connection to a judicial or official proceeding.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 84
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states that Yates \"remains goo"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_069",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Hoag v. New Jersey\n\n**Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958)** is no longer controlling precedent on its core holding. The case addressed jury selection and the prosecution's ability to challenge jurors based on implied bias, but it was substantially undermined and effectively overruled by **Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)**, which established strict limits on peremptory challenges based on race and created the \"Batson challenge\" framework.\n\nWhile *Hoag* is still cited in limited historical contexts, courts do not treat it as controlling authority on peremptory challenges.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 155
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Hoag v. New Jersey is no longer controlling prec"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_070",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960), remains good law and is still cited as controlling precedent on its holding regarding federal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations. However, its specific application has been limited by subsequent legislation, particularly the Indian Major Crimes Act amendments and the expansion of tribal sovereignty doctrines in cases like United States v. Wheeler (1978), which recognized tribal criminal jurisdiction as inherent rather than derivative.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 103
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer states that Forman \"remains good law and is still cited as controlling pre"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_071",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), regarding equitable recoupment in federal tax cases, remains good law. However, its precedential scope has been narrowed: the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990), limited equitable recoupment's availability in tax cases, effectively restricting Jenkins' application in certain contexts.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 99
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states that Jenkins \"remains goo"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_072",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), is **not controlling precedent** on its core holding. The Supreme Court effectively overruled Halper's double jeopardy analysis in **United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)**, which rejected Halper's approach of using a proportionality test to determine whether a civil penalty constitutes \"punishment\" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery established that civil penalties are not subject to double jeopardy restrictions unless they are so severe as to be \"overwhelmingly disproportionate\" to any legitimate remedial purpose, a much more defendant-protective standard.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 166
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: The answer cites *United States v. Ursery"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_073",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Grady v. Corbin*, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), is no longer good law. It was overruled by *United States v. Dixon*, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on successive prosecutions is governed solely by the \"same elements\" test from *Blockburger v. United States*, rather than the additional \"same conduct\" test that *Grady* had imposed.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 119
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that *Grady v. Corbin* is no longer good law and expl"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_074",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Twining v. New Jersey*, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), is no longer good law. It was overruled by *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. *Twining* had held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not incorporated, but this was later overruled by *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 137
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Twining is no longer good law and accurately cit"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_075",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Cohen v. Hurley (1961) is no longer controlling precedent. The Supreme Court effectively overruled it in *Shelley v. Kraemer* principles and subsequent cases establishing that state action doctrine protections apply to bar discrimination. More directly, *New York State Club Assn. v. City of New York* (1989) and evolving equal protection jurisprudence have superseded Cohen's permissive approach to private discrimination that state action facilitated.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 107
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Cohen v. Hurley is \"no longer co"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_076",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Agins v. City of Tiburon*, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), is no longer controlling precedent for one of its central holdings. In *Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 544 U.S. 528 (2005), the Supreme Court overruled *Agins*'s \"substantially advances\" test for regulatory takings claims under the Fifth Amendment, holding that this test was not the proper standard. However, *Agins* remains good law regarding the \"essential nexus\" requirement\u2014though that doctrine has since been further developed in cases like *Dolan v. City of Tigard* (1994).",
    "input_tokens": 80,
    "output_tokens": 162
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that *Agins* was overruled by *Lingle v. Chevron* reg"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_077",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), remains good law. It established that witnesses cannot refuse to testify before a grand jury based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination merely because they fear prosecution\u2014a witness must have a reasonable ground to apprehend danger from answering specific questions. However, this precedent has been significantly limited by subsequent case law clarifying that witnesses *can* invoke the Fifth Amendment when they have actual reasonable grounds to believe answers would incriminate them, effectively narrowing Sinclair's impact on modern practice.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 131
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer states \"Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), remains good law,\""
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_078",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Walton v. Arizona is no longer good law. It was overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must find the existence of aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 74
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Walton v. Arizona is no longer good law and expl"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_079",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Delli Paoli v. United States\n\nI don't have specific information about a Supreme Court case called \"Delli Paoli v. United States\" in my training data. To accurately answer whether it remains good law and controlling precedent, I would need to verify the correct case name, year, and jurisdiction, then check whether it has been overruled or superseded.\n\nI'd recommend checking current legal databases like Google Scholar (scholar.google.com), the Supreme Court's official website, or Justia to confirm its status.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 119
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer fails to identify that Delli Paoli was overruled by Bruton v. United State"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_080",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), was overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2006). Crawford established that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause requires that testimonial hearsay be subject to cross-examination, replacing Roberts's \"indicia of reliability\" test with a categorical approach focused on whether statements are \"testimonial\" in nature.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 101
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=1**: The answer explicitly states that Ohio v. R"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_081",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. **Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)** has been overruled by **Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)**. Payne held that victim impact evidence is admissible during the sentencing phase of capital cases, directly reversing Booth's prohibition on such evidence. Payne remains the controlling precedent on this issue.",
    "input_tokens": 74,
    "output_tokens": 100
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Booth v. Maryland was overruled by Payne v. Tenn"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_082",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "**South Carolina v. Gathers** (1989) is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by **Payne v. Tennessee** (1991), which held that victim impact evidence is admissible in capital sentencing proceedings and does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Payne reversed Gathers's holding that such evidence was constitutionally impermissible.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 88
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that South Carolina v. Gathers is no longer controlli"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_083",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "**Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury** (a 1989 Michigan case regarding corporate income tax apportionment) remains good law in Michigan as controlling precedent on its specific holding regarding the state's single-factor sales apportionment formula.\n\nHowever, you should verify the current applicability depending on your jurisdiction and specific issue, as Michigan's tax laws and apportionment rules have been amended since 1989, and federal constitutional principles governing state tax jurisdiction continue to evolve.",
    "input_tokens": 78,
    "output_tokens": 108
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states the case \"remains good la"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_084",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Parden v. Terminal Railroad Co. of Alabama Docks Department\n\n**Status:** This case is **no longer good law** as controlling precedent.\n\n**What happened:** The Supreme Court's decision in *Parden v. Terminal Railroad Co.* (1964), which held that states had not waived sovereign immunity under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), was **effectively overruled by *Alden v. Maine* (1999)** and related sovereign immunity jurisprudence. More directly, Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity in certain contexts through legislation like the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act, which superseded the reasoning in *Parden*.\n\nThe case's holding regarding FELA and state sovereign immunity is no longer the controlling standard for analyzing state liability in federal employment law contexts.",
    "input_tokens": 84,
    "output_tokens": 185
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Parden is \"no longer good law\""
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_085",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Parden v. Terminal Railroad Co. of Alabama Docks Department\n\n**Status: Overruled**\n\nParden v. Terminal Railroad Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against state-owned railroads in federal court. This decision was effectively overruled by **Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida**, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which established that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I powers and significantly restricted federal question jurisdiction over state actors. Parden is no longer controlling precedent.",
    "input_tokens": 84,
    "output_tokens": 142
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Parden was overruled and is no longer controllin"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_086",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) is no longer controlling precedent. The Supreme Court effectively overruled its holding in Saenz v. Roe (1999), which invalidated durational residency requirements for welfare benefits on different constitutional grounds (the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than equal protection), and subsequent decisions have narrowed Shapiro's scope considerably.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 87
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer correctly states that Shapiro "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_087",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Yes, **Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)** remains good law and a controlling Supreme Court precedent. It established that welfare home visits do not violate the Fourth Amendment when authorized by statute and conducted without a search warrant, provided the recipient is informed of the visit's purpose and can refuse entry (though refusal may result in benefit termination). No Supreme Court decision has overruled or superseded it.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 101
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: The answer states that the case \"remains "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_088",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which held that Congress lacks power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity, reversing Union Gas's contrary holding.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 92
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=1**: The answer correctly identifies that Penn"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_089",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "Simpson v. Rice is not controlling precedent in most U.S. jurisdictions today. The case involved a dispute over land rights and has been substantially superseded by subsequent statutory law and more modern case precedent addressing property rights and adverse possession. You would need to consult current case law in your specific jurisdiction to determine if any of its principles remain valid in your particular context.",
    "input_tokens": 73,
    "output_tokens": 80
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Simpson v. Rice is not controlling precedent tod"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_090",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Arnett v. Kennedy (1974) is not controlling precedent on its core holding. The Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) overruled Arnett's requirement that employees receive pre-termination notice and hearing before dismissal, establishing that due process requires only pre-termination notice and a pre-termination opportunity to respond, with a full hearing coming post-termination. However, Arnett remains good law on other issues, such as certain aspects of property interest analysis in employment.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 119
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Arnett v. Kennedy was overruled by Cleveland Boa"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_091",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), is no longer controlling precedent. It was effectively overruled by *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), which established that an individual's state-created liberty interest in personal property receives no constitutional protection unless the state provides a procedure for recovery, and that negligent deprivation of property does not violate the Due Process Clause even with inadequate state remedies.",
    "input_tokens": 76,
    "output_tokens": 115
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct=0**: While the answer correctly states that *P"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_092",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), is not good law as controlling precedent. The Supreme Court's decision in *City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey*, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), and subsequent dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence have superseded its reasoning regarding state regulation of commerce. Modern Commerce Clause doctrine, particularly the balancing test established in *Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.*, 397 U.S. 137 (1970), has replaced the framework Liggett represented.",
    "input_tokens": 80,
    "output_tokens": 138
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Liggett Co. v. Baldridge is \"not good law as con"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_093",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health\n\n**No, this case is no longer controlling precedent.** City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), was **overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022)**, which eliminated the federal constitutional right to abortion and returned abortion regulation to the states. The Dobbs decision explicitly overruled both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, of which Akron was a component part.",
    "input_tokens": 84,
    "output_tokens": 149
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that the case is no longer controlling precedent and "
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_094",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), was overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). Dobbs overturned Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, eliminating the federal constitutional right to abortion and returning regulatory authority to the states.",
    "input_tokens": 87,
    "output_tokens": 108
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- **currency_correct=1**: The answer correctly identifies that Thornb"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_095",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "# Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania\n\n**Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928)** remains good law as Supreme Court precedent. The case, which established that a state tax on interstate commerce must have a sufficient nexus to the state and must not discriminate against interstate commerce, has not been overruled or superseded.\n\nHowever, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has evolved significantly since 1928, and modern cases like *City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey*, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), and *Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison*, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), provide more developed frameworks for analyzing state taxation of interstate commerce. Courts would apply contemporary dormant Commerce Clause standards rather than relying solely on *Quaker City* analysis.",
    "input_tokens": 80,
    "output_tokens": 206
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 1,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=1\n\nThe answer explicitly states that Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania \"remains good l"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_096",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Goesaert v. Cleary*, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), is no longer good law. The Supreme Court has effectively superseded it through subsequent decisions applying heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, particularly *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which established intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination. *Goesaert*'s upholding of a Michigan law excluding women from bartending without male relatives is fundamentally inconsistent with modern equal protection doctrine.",
    "input_tokens": 79,
    "output_tokens": 132
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that *Goesaert v. Cleary* is no longer good law and e"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_097",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, *Morey v. Doud* is no longer good law. The Supreme Court overruled it in *City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey*, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), which rejected *Morey's* special category of per se invalid state laws under the Commerce Clause and established that discrimination claims should be analyzed under the Pike balancing test instead.",
    "input_tokens": 77,
    "output_tokens": 89
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that *Morey v. Doud* is no longer good law and is ove"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_098",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Hoyt v. Florida is not good law. The Supreme Court overruled it in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), which held that gender-based peremptory challenges in jury selection violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. J.E.B. is now the controlling precedent.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 95
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 0,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=0  anchor_leak=0\n\n**Explanation:**\n\n- **currency_correct = 0**: While the answer correctly identifies t"
   }
  },
  {
   "pair_id": "scotus_099",
   "track_b": {
    "text": "No, Swain v. Alabama is no longer controlling precedent. It was overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which established the modern framework for challenging peremptory strikes as violating equal protection rights. Under Batson, attorneys must articulate race-neutral reasons for strikes, and judges must evaluate whether those reasons are pretextual\u2014a significantly more protective standard than Swain's prior requirements.",
    "input_tokens": 75,
    "output_tokens": 105
   },
   "track_b_score": {
    "currency_correct": 1,
    "anchor_leak": 0,
    "judge_text": "currency_correct=1  anchor_leak=0\n\nThe answer correctly identifies that Swain v. Alabama was overruled by Batson v. Kent"
   }
  }
 ]
}